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We discuss in detail the derivation of stochastic differential equations for the continuum time limit
of the Minority Game. We show that all properties of the Minority Game can be understood by a
careful theoretical analysis of such equations. In particular, i) we confirm that the stationary state
properties are given by the ground state configurations of a disordered (soft) spin system; ii) we
derive the full stationary state distribution; iii) we characterize the dependence on initial conditions
in the symmetric phase and iv) we clarify the behavior of the system as a function of the learning
rate. This leaves us with a complete and coherent picture of the collective behavior of the Minority
Game. Strikingly we find that the temperature like parameter which is introduced in the choice
behavior of individual agents turns out to play the role, at the collective level, of the inverse of a
thermodynamic temperature.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even under the most demanding definition, the Mi-
nority Game (MG) [1,2] definitely qualifies as a complex
system. The MG can be regarded as an Ising model for
systems of heterogeneous adaptive agents, who interact
via a global mechanism that entails competition for lim-
ited resource, as found for instance in biology and finan-
cial markets. In spite of more than three years of intense
research, its rich dynamical behavior is still the subject
of investigations, many variations of the basic MG be-
ing proposed, each uncovering new surprising regions of
phase space.
Most importantly, Refs. [3–7] have shown that much
theoretical insight can be gained on the behavior of this
class of models, using non-equilibrium statistical physics
and statistical mechanics of disordered systems. The ap-
proach of Refs. [3–6] rests on the assumption that, in a
continuum time limit (CTL), the dynamics of the MG
can be described by a set of deterministic equations.
From these, one derives a function H which is minimized
along all trajectories; hence, the stationary state of the
system corresponds to the ground state of H , which can
be computed exactly by statistical mechanics techniques.
This approach has been challenged in Refs. [8,9], which
have proposed a stochastic dynamics for the MG, thus
leading to some debate in the literature [10,11].
In this paper, our aim is to analyze in detail the deriva-
tion of the CTL in order to clarify this issue. We show
that a proper derivation of the CTL indeed reconciles the
two approaches: the resulting dynamical equations – Eqs.
(15-17) below, which are our central result – are indeed
stochastic, as suggested in Ref. [8,9], but still the sta-
tionary state of the dynamics is described by the minima
of the function H , as suggested in Refs. [3,4]. We then
confirm the analytic results derived previously. In few
words, our analysis follows two main steps: first we char-
acterize the average behavior of agents by computing the
frequency with which they play their strategies. This step
can be translated in the study of the ground state prop-
erties of a soft spin disordered Hamiltonian. Secondly
we characterize the fluctuations around the average be-
havior. To do this, we explicitly solve the Fokker-Planck
equation associated to the stochastic dynamics.
The new results which we derive are:
1. we derive the full probability distribution in the
stationary state. Remarkably we find that the pa-
rameter which is introduced as a temperature in
the individual choice model, turns out to play the
role of the inverse of a global temperature;
2. for α > αc the distribution factorizes over the
agents whereas in the symmetric phase (α < αc)
agents play in a correlated way. In the latter case,
the correlations contribute to the stochastic force
acting on agents. We show how the dependence of
global efficiency on individual temperature found
in Ref. [8] arises as a consequence of these correla-
tions;
3. we extend the analytic approach of Refs. [3,4] to the
α < αc phase and asymmetric initial conditions.
The dependence on the initial conditions in this
phase, first noticed and discussed in Refs. [3,4], has
been more recently studied quantitatively in Refs.
[9,7]. We clarify the origin of this behavior and
derive analytic solutions in the limit Γ→ 0.
4. we show that the stronger is the initial asymmetry
in agents evaluation of their strategies, the larger
is the efficiency and the more stable is the system
against crowd effects [12].
5. we derive the Hamiltonian of MGs with non-linear
payoffs.
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This leaves us with a coherent picture of the collective
behavior of the Minority Game which is an important
reference framework for the study of complex systems of
heterogeneous adaptive agents.
II. THE MODEL
The dynamics of the MG is defined in terms of dynam-
ical variables Us,i(t) in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . . . These
are scores, propensities or “attractions” [14] which each
agent i = 1, . . . , N attaches to each of his possible choices
s = 1, . . . , S. Each agent takes a decision si(t) with
Prob{si(t) = s} = e
ΓiUs,i(t)∑
s′ e
ΓiUs′,i(t)
(1)
where Γi > 0 appears as an “individual inverse tempera-
ture”. The original MG corresponds to Γi = ∞ [1], and
was generalized later to Γi ≡ Γ <∞ [8].
The public information variable µ(t) is given to all
agents; it belongs to the set of integers (1, . . . , P ), and can
either be the binary encoding of last M winning choices
[1], or drawn at random from a uniform distribution [15];
we stick to the latter case for sake of simplicity∗. The ac-
tion a
µ(t)
si(t),i
of each agent depends the on its choice si(t)
and on µ(t). The coefficients aµs,i, called strategies, plays
the role of quenched disorder: they are randomly drawn
signs (Prob{aµs,i = ±1} = 1/2), independently for each i,
s and µ. On the basis of the outcome
A(t) =
N∑
i=1
a
µ(t)
si(t),i
(2)
each agent updates his scores according to
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t)− aµ(t)s,i
A(t)
P
. (3)
The idea of this equation is that agents reward [Us,i(t+
1) > Us,i(t)] those strategy which would have predicted
the minority sign −A(t)/|A(t)|. The MG was initially
proposed with a nonlinear dependence on A(t), i.e. with
a dynamics Us,i(t + 1) = Us,i(t) − aµ(t)s,i signA(t). This
leads to qualitatively similar results. The extension of
our theory to non-linear cases is dealt with in the ap-
pendix. We shall not discuss any longer the interpreta-
tion of the model, which is discussed at length elsewhere
[4,17–19].
The source of randomness are in the choices of µ(t) by
Nature and of si(t) by agents. These are fast fluctuating
∗Both prescriptions lead to qualitatively similar results for
the quantities we study here. See [16] for more details.
degrees of freedom. As a consequence also Us,i(t) and
hence the probability with which agents chose si(t) are
subject to stochastic fluctuations. Our analysis will in-
deed focus on the characterization of the low-frequency
fluctuations of Us,i, by integrating our the high frequency
fluctuations of µ(t) and si(t). This will become clearer
in the next section. For the time being let it suffice to
say that there are two level of fluctuations, that of “fast”
variables µ(t) and si(t) and that of “slow” degrees of
freedom Us,i(t).
The key parameter is the ratio α = P/N [18] and two
relevant quantities are
σ2 = 〈A2〉, H = 1
P
P∑
µ=1
〈A|µ〉2 (4)
which measure, respectively, global efficiency and pre-
dictability†.
Generalizations of the model, where agents account for
their market impact [3,4], where deterministic agents –
so-called producers – are present [5], or where agents are
allowed not to play [20–24], have been proposed. Rather
than dealing with the most generic model which would
depend on too many parameters, we shall limit our dis-
cussion to the plain MG. Furthermore we shall specialize,
in the second part of the paper to the case S = 2 which
lends itself to a simpler analytic treatment. The analysis
carries through in obvious ways to the more general cases
discussed in Refs. [4,5,3,24].
III. THE CONTINUUM TIME LIMIT
Our approach, which follows that of Refs. [3,4], is based
on two key observations:
1. the scaling σ2 ∼ N , at fixed α, suggests that typi-
cally A(t) ∼
√
N . Hence time increments of Us,i(t),
in Eq. (3) are small (i.e. of order
√
N/P ∼ 1/
√
N);
2. characteristic times of the dynamics are propor-
tional to P . Naively this is because agents need
to “test” their strategies against all P values of µ,
which requires of order P time steps. More pre-
cisely, one can reach this conclusion by measuring
relaxation or correlation times and verifying that
they indeed grow linearly with P (see Ref. [10]).
The second observation implies that one needs to study
the dynamics in the rescaled time τ = t/P . This makes
†Averages 〈. . .〉 stand for time averages in the stationary
state of the process. Then 〈. . . |µ〉 stands for time averages
conditional on µ(t) = µ.
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our approach differ from that of Refs. [8,9], where the
time is not rescaled.
In order to study the dynamics for P,N ≫ 1 at fixed
α, we shall focus on a fixed small increment dτ such that
Pdτ = αNdτ ≫ 1. This means that we take the con-
tinuum time limit dτ → 0 only after the thermodynamic
limit N →∞. We focus only on the leading order in N .
Furthermore we shall also consider Γi finite and
Γidτ ≪ 1 (5)
which means that the limit Γi → ∞ should be taken
after the limit dτ → 0. The orders in which these limits
are taken, given the agreement with numerical simulation
results, does not really matters: as we shall see differences
only enter in the finite size corrections. We shall come
back later to these issues.
Iteration of the dynamics for Pdτ time steps, from
t = Pτ to t = P (τ + dτ) gives
us,i(τ + dτ)− us,i(τ) = − 1
P
P (τ+dτ)−1∑
t=Pτ
a
µ(t)
s,i A(t). (6)
where we have introduced the functions us,i(τ) =
Us,i(Pτ).
Let us separate a deterministic (dus,i) from a stochas-
tic (dWs,i) term in this equation by replacing
a
µ(t)
s,i A(t) = as,i〈A〉π +Xs,i(t). (7)
Here and henceforth, we denote averages over µ by an
over-line
R =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
Rµ,
while 〈. . .〉π stands for an average over the distributions
πs,i(τ) =
1
Pdτ
P (τ+dτ)−1∑
t=Pτ
eΓiUs,i(t)∑
r e
ΓiUr,i(t)
, (8)
which is the frequency with which agent i plays strategy
s in the time interval Pτ ≤ t < P (τ + dτ).
Notice that πs,i(τ) will themselves be stochastic vari-
ables, hence we also define the average on the stationary
state as
〈. . .〉 = lim
τ0,T→∞
1
T
∫ τ0+T
τ0
dτ〈. . .〉π(τ) (9)
where the average inside the integral is performed with
the probabilities πs,i(τ).
Hence:
us,i(τ + dτ) − us,i(τ) = dus,i(τ) + dWs,i(τ)
= −as,i〈A〉πdτ + 1
P
P (τ+dτ)−1∑
t=Pτ
Xs,i(t) (10)
Now the first term is of order dτ as required for a deter-
ministic term. In addition it remains finite as N → ∞
[25].
The second term is a sum of Pdτ random variables
Xs,i(t) with zero average. We take dτ fixed and N very
large, so that Pdτ ≫ 1 and we can use limit theorems.
The variables Xs,i(t) are independent from time to time,
because both µ(t) and sj(t) are drawn independently at
each time. Hence Xs,i(t) for Pτ ≤ t < P (τ + dτ) are
independent and identically‡ distributed. For Pdτ ≫ 1
we may approximate the second term dWs,i of Eq. (10)
by a Gaussian variable with zero average and variance
〈dWs,i(τ)dWr,j(τ ′)〉 = δ(τ − τ
′)
P 2
P (τ+dτ)∑
t=Pτ
〈Xs,i(t)Xr,j(t)〉π
= δ(τ − τ ′)dτ 〈Xs,i(t)Xr,j(t)〉π
P
where the δ(τ − τ ′) comes from independence of Xs,i(t)
and Xr,j(t
′) for t 6= t′ and the fact that Xs,i(t) are iden-
tically distributed in time leads to the expression in the
second line. Now:
〈Xs,i(t)Xr,j(t)〉π
P
=
as,iar,j〈A2〉π
P
− as,i〈A〉π ar,j〈A〉π
P
(11)
The second term always vanishes for N → ∞ because
as,i〈A〉π is of order N0 [25]. In the first term, instead,
〈A2|µ〉π = N +
N∑
k 6=l=1
∑
s′,r′
aµs′,ka
µ
r′,lπs′,kπr′,l (12)
is of order N which then gives a positive contribution in
Eq. (11) for N →∞.
Eq. (12) leads to a stochastic dynamics where the noise
covariance depends on the stochastic variables us,i(τ)
themselves. The complications which result from this
fact can be avoided if one takes the approximation
〈A2|µ〉π ≈ 〈A2〉 ≡ σ2. (13)
This approximation can be justified naively by observ-
ing that the dependence on πs,i of the correlations only
involves the global quantity 〈A2|µ〉π/P for which one ex-
pects some sort of self-averaging properties. Numerical
results suggest that terms which are ignored by Eq. (13)
are negligible for N ≫ 1, but we were unable to prove
‡Strictly speaking, si(t) is drawn from the distribution in Eq.
(1) and not from πs,i of Eq. (8). However these two distri-
butions differ by a negligible amount as long as the condition
(5) holds (see later).
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this in general [26] (Eq. (13) holds trivially in the limit
Γ→ 0).
Within this approximation, the correlation, for N ≫ 1,
become
〈dWs,i(τ)dWr,j(τ ′)〉 ∼= σ
2
αN
as,iar,jδ(τ − τ ′)dτ (14)
Note that, for r 6= s or j 6= i, correlations
〈dWs,i(τ)dWr,j(τ ′)〉 ∝ as,iar,j ∼ 1/
√
N vanishes as
N → ∞. However it is important to keep the off-
diagonal terms because they keeps the dynamics of the
phase space point |U(t)〉 = {Us,i(t)}s=1,...,S, i=1,...,N con-
strained to the linear space spanned by the vectors |aµ〉 =
{aµs,i}s=1,...,S, i=1,...,N which contains the initial condition
|U(0)〉. The original dynamics of Us,i(t) indeed posses
this property.
It is important to remark that the approximation Eq.
(13) makes our approach a self-consistent theory for σ2.
We introduce σ2 as a constant in Eq. (13) which then
has to be computed self-consistently from the dynamic
equations.
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FIG. 1. Noise strength averaged over all agents (stars);
when it is multiplied by α (diamonds), one recovers σ2/N
(circles) (P = 32, S = 2, 300P , iterations, Γ = ∞, average
over 50 samples). Dashed lines are for eye guidance only
Summarizing, the dynamics of us,i is described by a
continuum time Langevin equation:
dus,i(τ)
dτ
= −as,i〈A〉+ ηs,i(τ) (15)
〈ηs,i(τ)〉 = 0 (16)
〈ηs,i(τ)ηr,j(τ ′)〉 ∼= σ
2
αN
as,iar,jδ(τ − τ ′). (17)
Equation (15), given its derivation, has to be inter-
preted in the Ito sense. The expression for the noise
strength is confirmed by figure 1 where the measure of
X =
∑
i,s〈(X2i,s〉/(PNS) in a MG is reported; note that
these numerical simulations were done for Γ = ∞ and
confirm Eq. (17) is valid even for α < αc. Fig. 2 com-
pares the results of numerical simulations of the MG, as
a function of Γ, with those of a semi-analytic solution of
Eqs. (15-17), to be discussed later. The agreement of the
two approaches shows that Eqs. (15-17) are valid even
in the symmetric phase (α ≤ αc) for all values of Γ.
The instantaneous probability distribution of s, in the
continuum time limit, reads
πs,i(τ) =
eΓius,i(τ)∑
r e
Γiur,i(τ)
. (18)
This and Ito calculus then lead to a dynamic equation
for πs,i(τ). We prefer to exhibit this for Γi = Γ and using
the rescaled time t = Γτ :
dπs,i
dt
= −πs,i
[
as,i〈A〉 − ~πi · ~ai〈A〉
]
+
σ2Γ
αN
πs,i
(
πs,i − ~π2i
)
+
√
Γπs,i (ηs,i − ~πi~ηi) . (19)
The first term in the r.h.s. comes from the deterministic
part of Eq. (15), the second from the Ito term (where
we neglected terms proportional to ai,sai,s′ ∼ 1/
√
N for
s 6= s′) and the third from the stochastic part. It is clear
that, in the limit Γ→ 0 the last two term vanish and the
dynamics becomes deterministic.
We see then that Γ tunes the strength of stochastic
fluctuations in much the same way as temperature does
for thermal fluctuations in statistical mechanics. The
“individual inverse temperature” Γ should indeed more
correctly be interpreted as a learning rate§. Furthermore
it plays the role of a “global temperature”. We shall
pursue this discussion in detail below for the case S = 2.
At this point, let us comment on the limit Γ → ∞,
which is of particular importance, since it corresponds
to the original MG. It is clear that in the limit Γ → ∞
the dynamical equations (19) become problematic. The
origin of the problem lies in the order in which the lim-
its N → ∞ and Γ → ∞ is performed. Indeed in Eq.
(8) Us,i(t) ≃ us,i(τ) + O(dτ) for Pτ ≤ t < P (τ + dτ).
Therefore, as long as Γdτ ≪ 1 the difference between
Eq. (8) and πs,i in Eq. (18) is negligible. In practice, in
order to satisfy both Γdτ ≪ 1 and Pdτ ≫ 1, one needs
Γ≪ P . When this condition is not satisfied the instanta-
neous probability Eq. (1) fluctuates very rapidly at each
time-step. Eq. (8) averages out these high frequency
fluctuations so that, even for Γ = ∞, the distribution
πs,i(τ) of Eq. (8) is not a discontinuous step function of
§This is an a posteriori learning rate. Indeed 1/Γ is the time
the dynamics of the scores needs in order to learn a payoff
difference. From a different viewpoint, Γ tunes the random-
ness of the response of agents. The larger the randomness,
the longer it takes to average fluctuations out.
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us,i(τ), as suggested by Eq. (18). High frequency fluc-
tuations contribute to the functional form of πs,i on us,i
which will differ from Eq. (18).
Summarizing, when we let Γ→∞ only after the limit
N → ∞ has been taken no problem arises. There is
no reason to believe that results change if the order of
the limits is interchanged. This expectations, as we shall
see, is confirmed by numerical simulations (see Fig. 2):
direct numerical simulations of the MG deviate from the
prediction of Eqs. (15-17) only for finite size effects which
vanish as N →∞.
Eqs. (15-17) are our central result. We shall devote the
rest of the paper to discuss their content and to show that
all of the observed behavior of the MG can be derived
from these equations.
IV. STATIONARY STATE
Let us take the average, denoted by 〈. . .〉, of Eq. (15)
on the stationary state (SS). Let
fs,i = 〈πs,i〉
be the frequency with which agent i plays strategy s in
the SS. Then we have
vs,i ≡
〈
dUs,i
dτ
〉
= −as,i〈A〉, 〈A|µ〉 =
∑
j,s′
fs′,ja
µ
s′,j
Given the relation between πs,i and Us,i and considering
that the long time dynamics of Us,i in the SS is Us,i(τ) =
const+vs,iτ , we have that i) each strategy which is played
in the SS by agent i must have the same “velocity” vs,i =
v∗i , and ii) strategies which are not played (i.e. with
fs,i = 0) must have vs,i < v
∗
i . In other words
− as,i〈A〉 = v∗i , ∀i, s such that fs,i > 0 (20)
−as,i〈A〉 ≤ v∗i , ∀i, s such that fs,i = 0. (21)
Consider now the problem of constrained minimization
ofH in Eq. (4), subject to fs,i ≥ 0 for all s, i and the nor-
malization conditions. Introducing Lagrange multipliers
λi to enforce
∑
s fs,i = 1 for all i, this problem reads
min
{fs,i≥0}
{
〈A〉2 −
N∑
i=1
λi
(
1−
S∑
s=1
fs,i
)}
. (22)
Taking derivatives, we find that if fs,i > 0 then
as,i〈A〉+λi = 0 whereas if fs,i = 0 then as,i〈A〉+λi ≥ 0.
These are exactly Eqs. (20,21) where v∗i = λi. We then
conclude that the two problems Eqs. (20,21) and Eq.
(22) are one and the same problem∗∗. In other words fs,i
can be computed from the constrained minimization of
H as proposed in Refs. [3,4].
Hence the statistical mechanics approach based on the
study of the ground state of H is correct. This ap-
proach gives the frequency fs,i with which agents play
their strategies.
We remark once more that H is a function of the sta-
tionary state probabilities fs,i. Also note that
H˜{πs,i} =
N∑
i,j=1
S∑
s,s′=1
as,ias′,jπs,iπs′,j
as a function of the instantaneous probabilities πs,i, is
not a Lyapunov function of the dynamics. The dynami-
cal variables πs,i(t) are subject to stochastic fluctuations
of the order of
√
Γi around their average values fs,i. Only
in the limit Γi → 0, when the dynamics becomes deter-
ministic and πs,i → fs,i, the quantity H˜{πs,i} becomes a
Lyapunov function.
The solution to the minimization ofH reveals two qual-
itatively distinct phases [3,4] which are separated by a
phase transition occurring as α → αc. We discuss quali-
tatively the behavior of the solution for a generic S and
leave for the next section a more detailed discussion in
the simpler case S = 2.
A. Independence on Γ for α > αc
When α > αc the solution to Eq. (22) is unique and
H > 0. Hence fs,i does not depends on Γ, neither does
H . In addition we shall see that
〈πs,iπs′,j〉 = 〈πs,i〉〈πs′,j〉 = fs,ifs′,j for i 6= j (23)
implying that
σ2 ≡ N +
∑
i6=j
∑
s,r
as,iar,j〈πs,iπr,j〉
does not depend on Γ either. Hence the solution {fs,i}
uniquely determines all quantities in the SS, as well as
∗∗Indeed both problems can be put in the form of a Linear
Complementarity problem [27]:
fs,i ≥ 0∑
j,s′
as,ias′,jfs′,j + v
∗
i ≥ 0
fs,i
[∑
j,s′
as,ias′,jfs′,j + v
∗
i
]
= 0
This problem has a solution for all values of v∗i because of
non-negativity of the matrix as,ias′,j , see Ref. [27].
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the parameters which enter into the dynamics (notice the
dependence on σ2 in Eq. 17). In particular σ2 does not
depend on Γ.
B. Dependence on Γ and on initial conditions for
α < αc
For α < αc the solution to the minimization problem
is not unique: there is a connected set of points {fs,i}
such that H = 0. Let us first discuss the behavior of the
system in the limit Γ→ 0, where the dynamics becomes
deterministic. The dynamics reaches a stationary state
{fs,i} which depends on the initial conditions.
In order to see this, let us introduce the vector notation
|v〉 = {vs,i, s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, . . . , N}. Then for all
times |u(τ)〉 is of the form
|u(τ)〉 = |u(0)〉+
P∑
µ=1
|aµ〉Cµ(τ)
where Cµ(τ) are P functions of time.
If there are vectors 〈v| such that 〈v|aµ〉 = 0 for all
µ, then 〈v|u(τ)〉 = 〈v|u(0)〉, i.e. the components of the
scores will not change at all along these vectors. As a re-
sult the SS will depend on initial conditions |u(0)〉. These
vectors 〈v| exist exactly for α < αc [4], because the “di-
mensionality” of the vectors |u(τ)〉 is larger than P ††.
The picture is made even more complex by the fact
that, for α < αc, when Γ is finite Eq. (23) does not
hold. Hence σ2 has a contribution which depends on the
stochastic fluctuations around fs,i. The strength of these
fluctuations, by Eqs. (17,19), depends on Γ and σ2 itself.
We face, in this case, a self-consistent problem: σ2 enters
as a parameter of the dynamics but should be computed
in the stationary state of the dynamics itself. Therefore
the solution to this problem and hence σ2 depends on
Γ. The solution {fs,i} to the minimization of H should
also be computed self-consistently. As a result, the SS
properties acquire a dependence on Γ.
The condition (23), which is similar to the clustering
property in spin glasses [28], plays then a crucial role. We
show below how the condition (23), the dependence on
initial conditions and on Γ enter into the detailed solution
for S = 2. By similar arguments our conclusion can be
generalized to all S > 2.
††In order to compute the dimensionality of the vectors |u〉
we have to take into account the N normalization conditions
and the fact that strategies which are not played (fs,i = 0)
should not be counted. So if there are N> variables fs,i > 0,
the relevant dimension of the space of |u〉 is N> −N . Hence
vectors 〈v| orthogonal to all |aµ〉 exist for N> −N > P , i.e.
for α < αc = N>(αc)/N − 1.
V. THE CASE S = 2
We work in this section with the simpler case of S = 2
strategies, labelled by s = ±. We also set Γi = Γ for all
i. Following Refs. [3,13] we introduce the variables
ξµi =
aµ+,i − aµ−,i
2
, Ωµ =
N∑
i=1
aµ+,i + a
µ
−,i
2
.
Let us rescale time t = Γτ and introduce the variables
yi(t) = Γ
U+,i(τ) − U−,i(τ)
2
Then, using Eq. (8), the dynamical equations (15-17)
become
dyi
dt
= −ξiΩ−
N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj) + ζi (24)
〈ζi(t)ζj(t′)〉 = Γσ
2
αN
ξiξjδ(t− t′). (25)
The Fokker-Planck (FP) equation for the probability
distribution P ({yi}, t) under this dynamics reads
∂P ({yi}, t)
∂t
=
N∑
i=1
∂
∂yi

ξiΩ +
N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh(yj)+
1
β
N∑
j=1
ξiξj
∂
∂yj

P ({yi}, t) (26)
where we have introduced the parameter
β =
2αN
Γσ2
. (27)
Multiply Eq. (26) by yi and integrate over all variables.
Using integration by parts, assuming that P → 0 fast as
yj →∞, one gets
∂
∂t
〈yi〉 = −ξiΩ−
N∑
j=1
ξiξj 〈tanh(yj)〉 .
Let us look for solutions with 〈yi〉 ∼ vit and define
mi = 〈tanh(yi)〉. Hence for t→∞ we have
vi = −ξiΩ−
N∑
j=1
ξiξjmj . (28)
Now, either vi = 0 and 〈yi〉 is finite, or vi 6= 0, which
means that yi → ±∞ and mi = sign vi. In the latter
case (vi 6= 0) we say that agent i is frozen [13], we call
F the set of frozen agents and φ = |F|/N the fraction of
frozen agents.
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As in the general case, the parameters vi for i ∈ F and
mi ≡ 〈tanh(yi)〉 for i 6∈ F are obtained by solving the
constrained minimization of
H =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
[
Ωµ +
N∑
i=1
ξµi mi
]2
.
When the solution of minH is unique, i.e. for α > αc,
the parameters mi depend only on the realization of dis-
order {ξµi ,Ωµ}, and their distribution can be computed
as in Ref [3]. When the solution is not unique, i.e. for
α < αc, we are left with the problem of finding which
solution the dynamics selects. Let us suppose that we
have solved this problem (we shall come back later to
this issue), so that all mi are known.
Using the stationary condition Eq. (28), we can
write the FP equation for the probability distribution
Pu(yi, i 6∈ F) of unfrozen agents. For times so large that
all agents in F are indeed frozen (i.e. si(t) = sign vi) this
reads:
∂Pu
∂t
=
∑
i6∈F
∂
∂yi
∑
j 6∈F
ξiξj
{
tanh(yj)−mj + 1
β
∂
∂yj
}
Pu.
This has a solution
Pu ∝ exp

−β
∑
j 6∈F
[log cosh yj −mjyj ]

 . (29)
Finally we have to impose the constraint that |y(t)〉 =
{yi(t)}Ni=1 must lie on the linear space spanned by the
vectors |ξµ〉 which contains the initial condition |y(0)〉.
This means that
Pu ∝ Py(0) exp

−β
∑
j 6∈F
[log cosh yj −mjyj]

 (30)
where the projector Py(0) is given by
Py(0) ≡
P∏
µ=1
∫ ∞
−∞
dcµ
N∏
i=1
δ
[
yi − yi(0)−
P∑
µ=1
cµξµi
]
. (31)
We find it remarkable that Γ, which is introduced as
the inverse of an individual “temperature” in the defini-
tion of the model, actually turns out to be proportional
to β−1 (see Eq. 27) which plays collectively a role quite
similar to that of temperature.
Using the distribution Eq. (30), we can compute
σ2 = H +
N∑
i=1
ξ2i (1−m2i ) +∑
i6=j
ξiξj〈(tanh yi −mi)(tanh yj −mj)〉. (32)
This depends on β, i.e. on σ2 itself by virtue of Eq.
(27). The stationary state is then the solution of a self-
consistent problem. Let us analyze in detail the solution
of this self-consistent problem.
A. α > αc
For α > αc the solution of minH is unique, and hence
mi depends only on the realization of the disorder. In
addition, the number N − |F| ≡ N(1 − φ) of unfrozen
agents is less than P and the constraint is ineffective,
i.e. Py(0) ≡ 1. The scores |y〉 of unfrozen agents span a
linear space which is embedded in the one spanned by the
vectors |ξµ〉. Hence the dependence on initial conditions
yi(0) drops out. Therefore the probability distribution
of yi factorizes, as in Eq. (29). Then the third term
of Eq. (32), which is the only one which depends on β,
vanishes identically. We conclude that, for α > αc, σ
2
only depends on mi and is hence independent of Γ as
confirmed by numerical simulations.
Summarizing, for α > αc one derives a complete solu-
tion of the MG by finding first the minimum {mi} of H
and then by computing σ2, β and the full distribution of
yi from Eq. (29).
B. α ≤ αc: dependence on Γ and crowd effects
When α < 1 − φ, on the other hand, the solution of
minH is not unique. Furthermore the constraint cannot
be integrated out and the stationary distribution depends
on the initial conditions.
Numerical simulations [8] show that σ2 increases with
Γ for α < αc (see Fig. 2). This effect has been related
to crowd effects in financial markets [12]. Ref. [6] has
shown that crowd effects can be fully understood in the
limit α→ 0: as Γ exceeds a critical learning rate Γc, the
time independent SS becomes unstable and a bifurcation
to a period two orbit occurs. Neglecting the stochastic
term ζi, Ref. [6] shows that this picture can be extended
to α > 0‡‡. This approach suggests a crossover to a
‡‡The idea of Ref. [6] is the following: imagine that our
system is close to a SS point y∗i at time t = tk, when µ(t) =
1. Will the system be close to y∗i when the pattern µ = 1
occurs again the next time t′ = tk+1? To see this, let us
integrate Eq. (24) from t = tk to tk+1. In doing this we
i) neglect the noise term (i.e. ζi = 0) and ii) assume that
tanh yi(t) ≈ tanh yi(tk) stays constant in the integration time
interval. This latter assumption is similar to the recently
introduced [7] batch version of the MG, where agents update
their strategies every P time-steps. This leads to study a
discrete time dynamical system
yi(tk+1) = yi(tk)− Γ
[
Ωξi +
N∑
j=1
ξiξj tanh[yj(tk)]
]
(33)
where the factor Γ comes because tk+1−tk is on average equal
to Γ. The linear stability of fixed point solutions is analyzed
setting yi(tk) = y
∗
i + δyi(k) and computing the eigenvalues of
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“turbulent” dynamics for Γ > Γc, where
Γc(α) =
4
(1 +
√
α)2(1−Q) (34)
and
Q =
1
N
N∑
i=1
m2i .
Both Q and Γc can be computed exactly in the limit
N →∞ within the statistical mechanics approach [3,6].
This approach however i) does not properly takes into
account the stochastic term, ii) does not explain what
happens for Γ > Γc and iii) does not explains why such
effects occur only for α < αc.
10−2 10−1 100 101 102
Γ
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σ
2 (Γ
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N=160 MG
N=320 MG
N=640 MG
N=160 Montecarlo
N=320 Montecarlo
N=640 Montecarlo
Theory Γ −> 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.4
0.6
0.8
Γ
c
FIG. 2. Global efficiency σ2/N versus Γ for α = 0.1 < αc
and different system sizes. Lines refer to direct simulations
of the MG with N = 160, 320 and 640. Finite size effect for
Γ≫ 1 are evident. Symbols refer instead to the solution of the
self-consistent equation (36) for the same system sizes. For
both methods and all values of N , σ2 is averaged over 100
realizations of the disorder. The arrow marks the location
of Γc predicted by Eq. (34). In the inset, the theoretical
prediction Eq. (37) on the leading behavior of σ2/N for Γ≪ 1
(solid line) is tested against numerical simulations of the MG
(points) for the same values of N .
The stochastic dynamics derived previously gives de-
tailed answers to all these issues. We first restrict atten-
tion to symmetric initial conditions yi(0) = 0 and then
discuss the dependence on initial conditions. The choice
of yi(0) = 0 ∀i is convenient because it allows one to
use this same symmetry to identify the solution {mi} to
the minimization of H , independently of Γ. To be more
precise, one can introduce a “magnetization”
the linearized map δyi(k+1) ≃
∑
j
Ti,jδyj(k). There is a crit-
ical value of Γ above which the solution y∗i become unstable,
which is given by Eq. (34).
M ≡ lim
t→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈si(t)si(0)〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
mi (35)
which measures the overlap of the SS configuration
with the initial condition. Symmetric initial conditions
are related to M = 0 SS. These are the states we focus
on. The solution is derived in two steps:
1. find the minimum {mi} of H , with M = 0;
2. compute self-consistently σ2.
The numerical procedure for solving the problem is the
following: given the realization of disorder {ξµi , Ωµ}, step
(1) — finding the minimum {mi} of H — is straightfor-
ward. For step (2) we sample the distribution Eq. (30)
with the Montecarlo method§§ at inverse temperature β
and measure the β dependent contribution of σ2 in Eq.
(32):
Σ(β) =
∑
i6=j
ξiξj〈(tanh yi −mi)(tanh yj −mj)〉β .
Here 〈. . .〉β stands for an average over the distribution
Eq. (30) with parameter β. Finally we solve the equation
σ2(Γ) = σ2(0) + Σ
(
2αN
Γσ2(Γ)
)
. (36)
This procedure was carried out for different system
sizes and several values of Γ. The results, shown in Fig.
2, agree perfectly well with direct numerical simulations
of the MG. Actually Fig. 2 shows that, for Γ ≫ 1, the
solution of the self-consistent equation (36) suffers much
less of finite size effects than the direct numerical simu-
lations of the MG. Fig. 2 also shows that, even if only
approximate, Eq. (34) provides an useful estimate of the
point where the crossover occurs.
It is possible to compute σ2(Γ) to leading order in Γ≪
1. The calculation is carried out in the appendix in detail.
The result is
σ2
N
∼= 1−Q
2
[
1 +
1−Q+ α(1 − 3Q)
4α
Γ +O(Γ2)
]
. (37)
§§The Montecarlo procedure follows the usual basic steps: i)
A move yi → yi + ǫξµi is proposed, with µ and ǫ drawn at
random, ii) the “energy”
E{yi} =
N∑
i=1
[log cosh yi −miyi]
of the new configuration is computed and iii) The move is
accepted with a probability equal to min(1, e−β∆E) where ∆E
is the “energy” difference.
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The inset of Fig. 2 shows that this expression indeed
reproduces quite accurately the small Γ behavior of σ2.
Note finally that Eq. (36) has a finite solution σ2(∞) =
σ2(0) + Σ(0) in the limit Γ→∞. Furthermore it is easy
to understand the origin of the behavior σ2/N ∼ 1/α for
Eq. (36). Because of the constraint, when ξiξj is positive
(negative) the fluctuations of tanh(yi)−mi are positively
(negatively) correlated with tanh(yj)−mj . If we assume
that 〈[tanh(yi)−mi][tanh(yj)−mj ]〉 ≃ cξiξj for some
constant c, we find Σ ≃ c∑i6=j ξiξj2. This leads easily
to Σ/N ≃ c/(4α), which explains the divergence of σ2/N
as α→ 0 for Γ≫ 1.
C. Selection of different initial conditions in the
Replica calculation
As discussed above, the stationary state properties of
the MG in the symmetric phase depend on the initial
conditions. Can the statistical mechanics approach to the
MG [3,4] be extended to characterize this dependence for
Γ≪ 1? If this is possible, how do we expect the resulting
picture to change when Γ increases? We shall first focus
on the first question (i.e. Γ ≪ 1) and then discuss the
second.
Of course one can introduce the constraint on the dis-
tribution of yi in the replica approach in a straightfor-
ward manner. This leads however to tedious calculations.
We prefer to follow a different approach. In the α < αc
phase the minimum ofH is degenerate, i.e. H = 0 occurs
on a connected set of points. Each of these points corre-
sponds to a different set of initial conditions, as discussed
above. In order to select a particular point with H = 0
we can add a potential η
∑
i(si − s∗i )2/2 to the Hamilto-
nian H , which will favor the solutions closer to s∗i , and
then let the strength η of the potential go to zero. This
procedure lifts the degeneracy and gives us the statistical
features of the equilibrium close to s∗i .
The nature of the stationary state changes as the
asymmetry in the initial conditions changes. If we take
s∗i = s
∗, the state at s∗ = 0 describes symmetric initial
conditions and increasing s∗ > 0 gives asymmetric states.
The saddle point equations of the statistical mechanics
approach of Ref. [3] can be reduced to two equations:
Q =
∫ ∞
−∞
Dzs20(z) (38)
χ =
1 + χ√
α(1 +Q)
∫ ∞
−∞
Dzzs0(z) (39)
where Dz = dz√
2π
e−z
2/2, s0(z) ∈ [−1, 1] is the value of s
which minimizes
Vz(s) =
1
2
s2 −
√
1 +Q
α
zs+
1
2
η(1 + χ)(s− s∗)2 (40)
and χ = β(Q− q)/α is a “spin susceptibility”. There are
two possible solutions: one with χ < ∞ finite as η → 0
which describes the α > αc phase. The other has χ ∼ 1/η
which diverges as η → 0. This solution describes the
α < αc phase. We focus on this second solution, which
can be conveniently parameterized by two parameters z0
and ǫ0. We find
s0(z) =


−1 if z ≤ −z0 − ǫ0
z+ǫ0
z0
if −z0 − ǫ0 < z < z0 − ǫ0
1 if z ≥ z0 − ǫ0
Indeed Eq. (38) gives Q(z0, ǫ0) and Eq. (39) which
for χ → ∞ reads
√
α(1 +Q) =
∫
Dzzs0(z), then gives
α(z0, ǫ0).
With ǫ0 6= 0 one finds solutions with a non-zero “mag-
netization” M = 〈si〉. This quantity is particularly
meaningful, in this context, because it measures the over-
lap of the behavior of agents in the SS with their a priori
preferred strategies
M ≡
∫ ∞
−∞
Dz s0(z) = lim
t→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
〈si(t)si(0)〉. (41)
Note indeed that one can always perform a “gauge”
transformation in order to redefine s = +1 as the initially
preferred strategy. This amounts to taking yi(0) ≥ 0 for
all i.
Which SS is reached from a particular initial condition
is, of course, a quite complex issue which requires the in-
tegration of the dynamics. However, the relation between
Q andM derived analytically from Eqs. (38,41) can eas-
ily be checked by numerical simulations of the MG. Fig-
ure 3 shows that the self-overlapQ and the magnetization
M computed in numerical simulations with initial con-
ditions yi(0) = y0 for all i, perfectly match the analytic
results. The inset of this figure shows how the final mag-
netization M and the self-overlap Q in the SS depend on
the asymmetry y0 of initial conditions.
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FIG. 3. Relation between Q and M , for α = 0.1, derived
from analytic calculation (full line) and from numerical sim-
ulations of the MG with different initial conditions y0 (⋄,
P = 32, N = 320, Γ = 0.1). The inset shows the depen-
dence of Q and M from the initial condition y0.
Let us finally discuss the dependence on Γ for asym-
metric initial conditions. Eq. (34) provides a character-
istic value of Γ as a function of α and Q. This theoretical
prediction is tested against numerical simulations of the
MG in Fig. 4: when plotted against Γ/Γc, the curves
of σ2/N obtained from numerical simulations, approxi-
mately collapse one onto the other in the large Γ region.
Fig. 4 suggests that Γc in Eq. (34) provides a close lower
bound for the onset of saturation to a constant σ2 for
large Γ. We find it remarkable that a formula such as
Eq. (34) which is computed in the limit Γ → 0, is able
to predict the large Γ behavior.
10−1 100 101 102
Γ/Γc
0
1
2
3
σ
2 /Ν
Γc= 0.260
Γc= 0.447
Γc= 0.757
Γc=1.382
Γc=2.099
FIG. 4. Global efficiency
σ2/N versus Γ/Γc for α = 0.1 < αc, N = 160 agents and
different initial conditions y0. The value Γc is computed from
Eq. (34) and is shown in the legend.
With respect to the dependence on initial conditions,
we observe that Γc is an increasing function of Q and
hence it increases with the asymmetry y0 of initial con-
ditions. Hence, for a fixed Γ, the fluctuation dependent
part Σ of σ2 decreases with y0 because it is an increasing
function of Γ/Γc. This effects adds up to the decrease of
the Γ independent part of σ2 discussed previously.
Fig. 4 also shows that the Γ≫ Γc state is independent
of initial conditions y0. This can naively be understood
observing that stochastic fluctuations induce fluctuations
δyi which increase with Γ. For Γ ≫ 1 the asymmetry
y0 of initial conditions is small compared to stochastic
fluctuations δyi and hence the system behaves as if y0 ≈
0.
D. The maximally magnetized stationary state
The maximally magnetized SS (MMSS), obtained in
the limit y0 → ∞, is also the one with the largest value
of Q, and hence with the smallest value of σ2 = N(1 −
Q)/2. σ2/N is plotted against α both for symmetric
y0 = 0 initial conditions and for maximally asymmetric
ones y0 → ∞ in fig. 5. The inset shows the behavior of
Q and M in the MMSS.
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FIG. 5. σ2/N for the MG with initial conditions y0 = 0
(full line) and y0 → ∞ (dashed line). The inset reports the
behavior of M and Q in the y0 →∞ SS. Note that Q is linear
in α.
Remarkably we find that σ2/N vanishes linearly with
α in the MMSS∗∗∗. This means that, at fixed P , as N
increases the fluctuation σ2 remains constant. This con-
trast with what happens in the y0 = 0 state, for Γ≪ Γc,
where σ2 increases linearly with N , and with the case
Γ≫ Γc where σ2 ∝ N2 [18,6]. Note also that the lowest
curve of Fig. 5 also gives an upper bound to the σ2 of
Nash equilibria (see Refs. [3,4,29]).
The MMSS is also the most stable state against crowd
effects: if we put Q(α, y0 =∞) ∼= 1− cα, as appropriate
for the MMSS we find that Γc ∼ 1/α diverges with α.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have clarified the correct derivation of continuous
time dynamics for the MG. This on the one hand recon-
ciles the two current approaches [3,9]. On the other it
leads to a complete understanding of the collective be-
havior of the MG. We confirm that stationary states are
characterized by the minimum of a Hamiltonian which
∗∗∗This results was also found analytically in [7]
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measures the predictability of the game. For α > αc we
find a complete analytic solution, whereas for α < αc
the statistical mechanics approach of Ref. [3] is valid for
Γ → 0. It is in principle possible to introduce the new
elements discussed here in the approach of Ref. [3] and
to derive a full analytic solution. We have indeed derived
the first term of the series expansion for Γ ≪ 1, which
agrees perfectly with numerical data. The extension of
the approach of Ref. [3] involves lengthy calculations and
it shall be pursued elsewhere.
Finally we note that the results derived in this paper
generalize to more complex models. It is worth to remark
that the solution to the FP equation is no more factor-
izable, in general, when agents account for their market
impact as in Refs. [3,6,4]. Hence, as long as there are
unfrozen agents, we expect that the stationary state de-
pends on Γ. However, when the agents take fully into
account their market impact, all of them are frozen and
the conclusion that agents converge to Nash equilibria
remains valid.
We acknowledge constructive discussions with A.C.C.
Coolen, A. Engel, J.P. Garrahan, J.A.F. Heimel and D.
Sherrington.
APPENDIX A: NON-LINEAR MINORITY
GAMES
Take a generic dynamics
Us,i(t+ 1) = Us,i(t) − aµ(t)s,i g [A(t)]
with g(x) some function. When we carry out the limit
to continuous time we find a deterministic term which is
proportional to −as,i〈g(A)〉. The stationary state condi-
tions then read
vi = −as,i〈g(A)〉, if fs,i > 0
and
vi > −as,i〈g(A)〉, if fs,i = 0.
For any fixed µ, A(t) is well approximated by a Gaus-
sian variable with mean
〈A|µ〉 =
∑
i,s
fs,ia
µ
s,i
and variance D = σ2 −H . Here we neglect dependences
on µ. Also we treat D as a parameter and neglect its de-
pendence on the stationary state probabilities fs,i. Hence
we can write
〈g(A)|µ〉 =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2π
e−x
2/2g
(
〈A|µ〉+
√
Dx
)
The stationary state conditions of the dynamics above
can again be written as a minimization problem of the
functional
Hg =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
∫ ∞
−∞
dx√
2π
e−x
2/2G

∑
i,s
fs,ia
µ
s,i +
√
Dx


with
g(x) =
dG(x)
dx
and D = σ2 − H which must be determined self-
consistently.
Indeed taking the derivative of Hg w.r.t. fs,i and im-
posing the constraint fs,i ≥ 0 and normalization, we ar-
rive at exactly the same equations which describe the
stationary state of the process.
The Hamiltonian for the original MG is derived setting
g(x) = signx, which leads to
Hsign =
1
P
P∑
µ=1
[
1√
π
e−〈A|µ〉
2/D +
〈A|µ〉√
D
erf
( 〈A|µ〉√
D
)]
.
The analysis of stochastic fluctuations can be extended
to non-linear cases in a straightforward manner. Again
the key point is that the dynamics is constrained to the
linear space spanned by the vectors |aµ〉. For α > αc we
have no dependence on initial conditions. However it is
not easy to show in general that the distribution of scores
factorizes across agents. This means that there may be
a contribution of fluctuations to σ2 – i.e. Σ > 0 – so
we cannot rule out a dependence of σ2 on Γ. Numerical
simulations for g(x) = signx show that such a depen-
dence, if it exists, is very weak. Anyway even though
σ2 only depend on fs,i, the minimization problem de-
pends on D = σ2 − H which must then be determined
self-consistently.
For α < αc the dependence on initial conditions in-
duces a correlation of scores across agents. As a result
σ2 depends on Γ just as in the linear case discussed above.
APPENDIX B: SMALL Γ EXPANSION
For Γ ≪ 1 it is appropriate to consider β ≫ 1 and to
take
yi = arc tanhmi +
zi√
β
so that β[log cosh yi −miyi] ≃ 12 (1 −m2i )z2i +O(β−1/2).
Hence we have to sample a distribution
P{zi} ∝ e−
1
2
∑
i
(1−m2i )z2i
where zi has the form
zi =
P∑
µ=1
cµξµi .
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It is convenient to express everything in terms of the
coefficients cµ. Their pdf is derived from that of zi and
it reads:
P{cµ} ∝ e−
1
2
∑
µ,ν
cµTµ,νcν
, T µ,ν =
N∑
i=1
(1−m2i )ξµi ξνi .
From this we find 〈cµcν〉 = [T−1]µ,ν .
Now we split the term Σ(β) in two contributions,
Σ(β) = 〈
[
N∑
i=1
ξi(tanh yi −mi)
]2
〉+
N∑
i=1
ξ2i
[
m2i − (tanh yi)2
]
and work them out separately. For the first we use
N∑
i=1
ξµi (tanh yi −mi) =
1√
β
∑
ν
T µ,νcν
so that
〈
[
N∑
i=1
ξi(tanh yi −mi)
]2
〉 = 1
βP
∑
µ,ν,γ
T µ,νT µ,γ〈cνcγ〉
=
TrT
βP
∼= 1−Q
2β
N.
Within the approximation (1 − 3m2i ) ≈ (1 − 3Q) we
are able to derive a closed expression also for the second
term:
N∑
i=1
ξ2i
[
m2i−(tanh yi)2
]
=
1
β
N∑
i=1
ξ2i (1−m2i )(1−3m2i )〈z2i 〉
≈ α
β
1− 3Q
2
N.
Hence we find
Σ(β) ∼=
[
1−Q
2
+
1− 3Q
2
α
]
1
β
+O(β−2).
This and Eq. (27) lead to Eq. (37).
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